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Abstract
This article reviews exoneration in Sweden, with a focus on
the procedure of applying for exoneration. First, it highlights
some core features of Swedish criminal procedural law, nec-
essary to understand exoneration in the Swedish context.
Secondly, it outlines the possibilities in Swedish law to apply
for exoneration, both in favour of a convicted person and to
the disadvantage of a previously acquitted defendant.
Thirdly, it identifies some challenges with the current Swed-
ish model of administering applications for exoneration.
Fourthly, it argues that the current system should be
reformed by introducing into Swedish law a review commit-
tee that administers applications for exoneration.
Keywords: wrongful convictions, extraordinary legal reme-
dy, exoneration, exoneration in Sweden
1 Introduction
Sweden is renowned for a legal system that respects the
rule of law.1 This respect is visible in some of the core
characteristics of the Swedish criminal justice system.
As with all the other Scandinavian countries, Sweden
does not allow plea bargaining, and the state provides a
public defence counsel whose costs are covered by state
funds.2 The defence counsel is also appointed at a very
early stage in the pre-trial investigation and successively
* Dennis Martinsson is Assistant Professor in the Department of Law of
Stockholm University in Sweden.
1. Sweden, for example, often ranks well internationally in regard to the
rule of law, see, e.g., The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2020,
available at https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/docu
ments/WJP-ROLI-2020-Online_0.pdf (last visited 17 February 2021),
which ranks Sweden among the top four countries in the world.
2. The strong main rule is that the state will cover the costs of the public
defence counsel (Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 21 Sec-
tion 10). Theoretically, if the defendant is convicted, he or she shall
reimburse the state for the public defence counsel’s litigation costs. The
reimbursement is limited to litigation costs listed in the Swedish Code of
Judicial Procedure, Chapter 31 Section 1. A convicted person might
also reimburse the costs of the injured party’s counsel (målsägandebi-
träde) and the special advocate for children (särskild företrädare för
barn). However, in practice, the defendant is not required to pay more
of the defence costs than he or she would have to pay as the legal aid
charge, if legal aid had been granted according to the Legal Aid Act.
The legal aid charge reimbursement will be decided according to the
defendant’s economic situation. If the defendant lacks economic
resources, the public defence counsel’s costs will be covered entirely by
the state. The defendant can, of course, hire a private defence counsel,
in which case the defendant covers the costs him- or herself.
receives information concerning the case from the pros-
ecutor. Other signs of the respect for the rule of law are
that the prosecutor should indict a person only if there
are sufficient reasons to believe that he or she commit-
ted the crime and if the assessment is that an indictment
will result in a guilty verdict. Further, the prosecutor
has the burden of proof and a conviction requires that
the evidence prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime. Another feature is that
Swedish law offers rather extensive possibilities for a
defendant who has been convicted by a district court to
appeal against the judgment.3 Thus, Sweden’s several
legal safeguards ensure that criminal law cases are trea-
ted fairly and justly.
Yet in recent years several cases of wrongful conviction
have been exposed in Sweden. A common denominator
in these cases is that the wrongful convictions have been
disclosed by journalists who have spent – at least
regarding some cases – years researching and scrutinis-
ing these cases.4 Eventually, applications for exoneration
3. Three instances in Sweden decide on criminal cases: the district court,
the court of appeal and the Supreme Court. There are forty-eight dis-
trict courts and six courts of appeal. From the Swedish Code of Judicial
Procedure, Chapter 51, it follows that Swedish law offers rather exten-
sive possibilities for the defendant to appeal against a pronounced judg-
ment by a district court. As a main rule, a review permit is not needed
here. However, in order to bring a case to the Supreme Court, a review
permit is needed, which is approved only if the case is “of importance
for the guidance of the application of law” or “if there are extraordina-
ry reasons for such a determination, such as that grounds exist for relief
for substantive defects or that a grave procedural error has occurred or
that the result in the court of appeal is obviously due to gross oversight
or to gross mistake” (Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 54
Section 10).
4. The most (in)famous case is Thomas Quick, who later changed his
name to Sture Bergwall. During the 1990s he confessed to numerous
murders in Sweden and Norway and was convicted of eight murders.
But he was later found not guilty of any of the murders to which he had
confessed. The journalist Hannes Råstam showed in three SVT docu-
mentaries, screened in 2008 and 2009, that the confessions were false
and a product of maltreatment in the psychiatric ward where Quick was
being held. The documentaries also showed that Quick had gained
information from the prosecutor and the police, enabling him to provide
details in his confessions. He received information directly from the
people involved in the pre-trial investigation. Therefore, the evidence
presented to the courts in each case was false. The Quick case promp-
ted a general debate and discussion among jurists in Sweden. A govern-
ment inquiry scrutinised each of the cases, see SOU 2015:52, with a
summary in English at 23-8. Another wrongful conviction disclosed
after investigation by a journalist is the case of Samir Sabri, who at the
age of fifteen confessed to the murder of his stepmother. He was con-
victed of this crime. In an investigating podcast entitled #Fallet, broad-
cast in 2015, journalist Anders Johansson found that Samir could not
possibly have committed the murder and that he had confessed so that
his father would not serve time in prison. Samir Sabri’s application for
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were filed in these cases, all of which were approved.
The result was a reopening, ending in acquittal of per-
sons who had previously been convicted.
Swedish law recognises two other legal remedies besides
exoneration5 for a post-conviction revision: restoration
of expired time and grave procedural error. However,
this article focuses solely on exoneration.6 This is
because the legal grounds serve different purposes;
exoneration serves to correct judgments that are materi-
ally incorrect, while the function of grave procedural
error is to correct judgments that are procedurally
incorrect. The purpose of restoration of expired time is
to regain an applicant’s lost right so that he or she can
use an ordinary legal remedy, for example the possibility
to appeal. Thus, these three extraordinary legal rem-
edies have very little in common. Another reason for
excluding restoration of expired time and grave proce-
dural error is that they presuppose that an application
has been filed within certain time frames, thereby limit-
ing the possibility to invoke these legal remedies. Also,
applications for exoneration are far more common in
criminal law cases than are the other two extraordinary
legal remedies.
Moreover, scholarly publications on exoneration in
Sweden are rather scarce, and research on exoneration
in Swedish criminal procedural law is in the nature of a
blank spot.7 Until recently, the main scholarly work
consisted of a PhD dissertation published in 1959.8
However, an ongoing PhD project in criminology9 and
an ongoing PhD project in procedural law focus on
exoneration.10 The subject was also recently analysed in
a published PhD thesis in jurisprudence, which focused
exoneration was approved, resulting in a reopening of the case. He was
eventually found not guilty.
5. Swedish law also contains a similar, but separate, provision for exonera-
tion in civil law cases, see Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chap-
ter 58 Section 1. The present review focuses solely on the provision for
exoneration in criminal law cases.
6. ‘Exoneration’ is the translation of the Swedish word resning, which is
sometimes translated as ‘new trial’, ‘review’ or ‘relief for a substantive
defect’. The Swedish word resningsansökan, i.e. the application for
exoneration, is sometimes also translated as ‘petition for a new trial’ or
‘application for a substantive defect’. For the purposes of this article and
for consistency, the terms ‘exoneration’ and ‘application for exonera-
tion’ will be used. However, using ‘exoneration’ is not unproblematic.
As will be seen later, Swedish law allows an application for exoneration
to the benefit of a convicted person and to the disadvantage of a previ-
ously acquitted defendant. It is also possible that an application con-
cerns only the sentence and not the question of whether the defendant
is guilty of the crime(s) committed. Thus, the concept of exoneration in
Sweden is wider than a petition for a new trial to the benefit of the
defendant. Using a more complicated phrasing than ‘exoneration’,
when referring to all aspects concerning the procedure of applying for
exoneration, would indeed be rather ungainly.
7. P.O. Träskman, ‘Rätten till riktig resning – En fråga försummad av for-
skningen?’, 92 Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab 249 (2005).
8. T. Cars, Om resning i rättegångsmål (1959).
9. Project conducted by Sara Hellqvist, Stockholm University. As a part,
she has published an analysis of data on cases of exoneration collected
during one year, see S. Hellqvist, ‘The Narrow Road to Exoneration –
the Incidence, Characteristics and Outcomes of Wrongful Conviction
Claims in Sweden over a One-Year Period’, 5 Bergen Journal of Crim-
inal Law and Criminal Justice 131 (2017).
10. Project conducted by Christina Kjellson, Uppsala University.
mainly on the concept of confirmation bias.11 Besides
the two published scholarly theses, there is literature
published by legal academics that provide an overview
of the Swedish regulations on exoneration. In addition,
the applicable Swedish provisions on exoneration have
remained practically unchanged since 1940. The lack of
legal research and the lack of legal reform provide yet
another reason to focus on exoneration.
The main purpose of this article is twofold: to review
the legal framework for exoneration in Sweden and to
discuss whether there is a need for a reform of the cur-
rent Swedish procedure for applications for exoneration.
The review shows that an application for exoneration in
Sweden can be based on several legal grounds and that it
can be filed either in favour of a convicted person or to
the disadvantage of a defendant who has previously been
acquitted. In the latter case, a time frame limits the pos-
sibilities for filing an application. Further, some chal-
lenges regarding the current Swedish model of handling
applications for exoneration are identified. Thus, the
review suggests that Sweden should start offering offi-
cial and annual statistics on the number of applications
filed and that Sweden should consider implementing a
different procedure for reviewing applications by
introducing a review committee.
2 Legal Framework for
Revision When Invoking
Exoneration
2.1 Basic Features to Understand Exoneration in
the Swedish Context
2.1.1 Balancing the Principle of Firmness and the
Principle of Truth
In Swedish law exoneration is categorised as an extraor-
dinary legal remedy,12 meaning that it can be invoked
only if a court has pronounced a legally binding judg-
ment.13 Thus, exoneration is relevant only when the
‘ordinary’ legal remedies – i.e. the possibility to appeal –
have been exhausted. Exoneration as a legal ground for
post-conviction revision has existed in Swedish law
since (at least) the seventeenth century.14 The current
11. Project conducted by Moa Lidén, Uppsala University, who defended her
PhD thesis in 2018. As a part, she published a co-written article on con-
firmation bias, where the matter of exoneration was discussed to some
extent; see M. Lidén, M. Gräns & P. Juslin, ‘Self-Correction of Wrongful
Convictions: Is There a “System-level” Confirmation Bias in the Swedish
Legal System’s Appeal Procedure for Criminal Cases? Part II’, 17 Law,
Probability and Risk 337 (2018).
12. This follows from the title of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure,
Chapter 58: “Extraordinary remedies”, in which the rules of exonera-
tion are stated.
13. According to Swedish criminal procedural law, this simply means that
the judgment can no longer be appealed against; see the Swedish Code
of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 30 Section 9 para. 1.
14. For a thorough overview of the historical development of the extraordi-
nary legal remedies (including exoneration) in Sweden, see Cars, above
n. 8, at 48-93. Note, generally, that the judicial system in Sweden – like
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provisions regulating exoneration entered into force in
1940. Despite minor changes, these provisions have
remained largely unchanged since then.15
From a normative point of view, an application for
exoneration is granted extremely rarely. The rationale
behind this position is the principle of firmness,16
according to which a legally binding judgment by a
court in a criminal law case should not be reconsidered.
This also ensures that the legal system is reliable in the
sense that a case will not be brought before a court
again. One might claim that the principle of firmness is
an expression of formal fairness. However, this contrasts
with the principle of truth,17 which means that it is
important that a judgment in a criminal law case is cor-
rect from the perspective of material fairness. According
to this principle, the law must offer a possibility to
quash wrongful convictions and a possibility for a
review of wrongful convictions; otherwise, the public
might lose their trust in the legal system. Therefore, the
design of the regulation of exoneration needs to find the
right balance between the principle of firmness and the
principle of truth.18 In Swedish criminal procedural law,
the rules on exoneration represent a compromise
between these two principles since they ensure that a
formally correct final verdict might (in rare cases) be
reopened in order to secure material fairness.19
To understand the legal framework on exoneration in
Swedish law, note that an application for exoneration is
viewed as a petition for reopening a case. As a main rule,
if an application is approved, a new trial should be held.
At the succeeding trial, the question of whether the
defendant is guilty is tried anew.
2.1.2 The Concept of the Binding Effect of a Judgment
and Its Relation to Exoneration
In Swedish criminal procedural law, res judicata (the
subject matter has already been adjudicated) and ne bis
in idem (prohibition against trying someone twice for the
same act) are viewed as two separate grounds for proce-
dural hindrance. An important expression of this is the
that in many other European countries – was reformed in the seven-
teenth century to include more modern approaches to the judiciary.
One example of the modernisation was the creation of a more distinct
division of different court levels. This also created a need for provisions
regulating the possibilities for a post-conviction revision. Previously,
Swedish law offered other extraordinary legal remedies that were simi-
lar to the present-day provisions on exoneration.
15. See the travaux préparatoires SOU 1926:32, at 231-44; SOU 1926:33,
at 135-41; SOU 1938:44, at 65-75, 572-82; prop. 1939:307; NJA II
1940 s. 147-86; NJA II 1943 s. 725-39. Some minor changes were
made in 1975, see the travaux préparatoires: prop. 1975:78, JuU
1975:22; NJA II 1975 s. 671, and in 1985, see the travaux prépara-
toires: prop. 1987/88:23, JuU 1987/88:15; NJA II 1987 s. 676. See
also, e.g., Supreme Court case NJA 2001 s. 687, at 689, where the
Court stated that the provisions regarding exoneration have remained
unchanged since 1940.
16. In Swedish: orubblighetsprincipen.
17. In Swedish: sanningsprincipen.
18. On the matter of balancing these two principles in both the legislature
and the judiciary, see Cars, above n. 8, at 173-6.
19. Cf. Supreme Court case NJA 1998 s. 321, at 322. Note that the balance
between these two principles differs, depending on whether an applica-
tion for exoneration is filed in favour of a convicted person or to the
disadvantage of a defendant who has previously been acquitted.
concept of the binding effect of a judgment, meaning
that an adjudicated case cannot be tried anew.20 Thus,
the binding effect of a judgment hinders a new trial.
However, if a court approves an application for exonera-
tion, it quashes the binding effect in the sense that the
previous judgment no longer hinders a new trial. Note
that an approval does not quash the original judgment.
The concept of the binding effect of a judgment has
been discussed mostly in the literature.21 The discussion
has focused mainly on the following criteria: the course
of events, the time and place of the act and against who
or what the act was committed. It has been suggested
that the criteria that constitute ‘the (same) act’ in the
Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 30 Section 9
para. 1, needs to coincide with the provision on exonera-
20. See the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 30 Section 9
para. 1: “Once the time for ordinary means of appeal has expired, the
issue of the defendant’s criminal liability for the act which was deter-
mined by the judgment may not be taken up again for adjudication.” It
should be noted that the concept of the binding effect of a judgment is
wider than the indictment, since it, for example, includes elements of
the crime that were not tried and includes cases where the prosecutor
decides to circumscribe the indictment; see the travaux préparatoires
SOU 1938:44, at 472; K. Olivecrona, Rättegången i brottmål enligt RB
(1968), at 159-60; T. Bylund, ‘Kioskinbrottet och rättskraftsspöket. En
strip-tease i sex moment’, in A. Agell, R. Boman & N. Jareborg (eds.),
Process och exekution. Vänbok till Robert Boman (1990) 41, at 46-53.
Further, the concept of the binding effect is also relevant in relation to
the possibility for the prosecutor to, during the ordinary proceeding, file
a prosecution adjustment (justering av åtal) respectively file an amend-
ment of the indictment (ändring av åtal). To put it simply, Swedish
criminal procedural law allows the prosecutor to rather easily file a
successful prosecution adjustment (Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure,
Chapter 45 Section 5 para. 3) but regulates the possibility for an
amendment of the indictment restrictively (Swedish Code of Judicial
Procedure, Chapter 45 Section 5 para. 1), since the main rule is that an
amendment is not allowed after the prosecutor has indicted someone.
This means that circumstances that could have been included in the
(original) trial by filing an amendment of the indictment, will be covered
by the binding effect of the (original) judgment. Thus, it hinders a sec-
ond trial. See further on this matter, e.g., P.O. Ekelöf, H. Edelstam & M.
Pauli, Rättegång. Andra häftet (2015), at 167-70. Note that the Swed-
ish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 30 Section 9 para. 1, needs to
be interpreted in line with European norms (i.e. res judicata and ne bis
in idem) that follow from, e.g., the practice of the EU Court of Justice
and the European Court of Human Rights. However, considering that
the concept of the binding effect of a judgment is comprehensive, it is
difficult to imagine that the application of the Swedish provision in this
regard would infringe the European norms. For an overview of the
Swedish concept of binding effect in relation to European norms, see,
e.g., P.O. Ekelöf, S. Andersson, H. Bellander, T. Bylund, H. Edelstam &
M. Pauli, Rättegång. Tredje häftet (2018), at 203-4, 218-21. See also
Supreme Court case NJA 2007 s. 557, where the Court referred to EU
case law when it determined the binding effect in a case of drug
offence.
21. The concept of the binding effect is rather complex, as it raises ques-
tions about the interpretation of several provisions in the Swedish Code
of Judicial Procedure that uses the same phrasing. One cannot simply
understand the meaning of the concept solely from one provision. The
matter is discussed further in, e.g., Ekelöf et al. (2018), above n. 20, at
203-21; P. Fitger et al., Rättegångsbalken (4 December 2019, Norstedts
Juridik), commentary to the Swedish Criminal Code on Judicial Proce-
dure, Chapter 30 Section 9; L. Welamson, Om brottmålsdomens rätt-
skraft (1949); Olivecrona, above n. 20, at 145-74; T. Andersson, ‘Brott-
målsdomens rättskraft’, in B. Lindell, H. Eklund, P. Asp & T. Andersson
(eds.), Straffprocessen (2005) 267, at 267-75; T. Andersson, ‘Straffpro-
cessuell rättskraft, särskilt i narkotikamål: Rättskraftsspöket går igen!’, in
B. Lindell and T. Andersson (eds.), Vänbok till Torleif Bylund (2003) 9,
at 9-51; Bylund, above n. 20, at 41-69.
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tion to the disadvantage of the defendant.22 Otherwise,
the concept of the binding effect would collide with the
rationale of the provision on exoneration to the
disadvantage of the defendant.23 Consequently, this rea-
soning suggests that the concept of the binding effect
indirectly demands that the prosecutor have a solid case
before indicting someone. If it were possible for the
prosecutor to ‘save’ evidence to a later trial, it would
create a risk that the pre-trial investigation is not
conducted as thoroughly as possible.24 The prosecutor
should therefore include alternative or cumulative ele-
ments of the crime when indicting someone.25
In conclusion, the effect of res judicata extends beyond
the indictment in the original trial. Additionally, the
concept of the binding effect of a judgment has direct
implications for exoneration. Since this concept is com-
prehensive in Swedish criminal procedural law, it sig-
nificantly narrows the possibility for a court to approve
an application for exoneration – particularly if the appli-
cation is filed to the disadvantage of a previously acquit-
ted defendant. In that case, the concept of the binding
effect could be viewed as a (strong) legal safeguard for
the individual, protecting him or her from a new trial.26
2.2 Grounds for Revision When Invoking
Exoneration
Swedish law offers two provisions – applicable in two
different situations – for a post-conviction revision in
criminal law cases when the applicant invokes exonera-
tion.27 An application for exoneration can be filed either
in favour of a convicted person (Swedish Code of Judicial
Procedure, Chapter 58 Section 2) or to the disadvantage
of a defendant who has previously been acquitted
(Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 58 Sec-
tion 3). These two main categories provide various sub-
categories of legal grounds for reopening the case. Since
the prerequisites for these two main categories differ to
some extent, they are presented separately.
When an application for exoneration is filed to the bene-
fit of a previously convicted person, Swedish law recog-
nises five legal grounds. They are regulated in the Swed-
ish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 58 Section 2,
which states:
22. This idea of coinciding the meaning of ‘the (same) act’ in the Swedish
Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 30 Section 9 para. 1, and the rule
on exoneration to the disadvantage of a previously acquitted defendant
was first presented by Lars Welamson; see Welamson, above n. 21, at
135-51. See also Ekelöf et al. (2018), above n. 20, at 206, 213-17;
Andersson (2005), above n. 21, at 269-70. On the possibilities to file an
application to the disadvantage of a previously acquitted defendant, see
Section 2.2.
23. Welamson, above n. 21, at 139.
24. Welamson, above n. 21, at 54-55, 144-45, 262. See also Andersson
(2005), above n. 21, at 270; Ekelöf et al. (2018), above n. 20, at 206.
25. See, e.g., K. Olivecrona, ‘Några rättsfall om ändring av åtal och res iudi-
cata i brottmål’, 42 Svensk juristtidning, 1, at 6 (1957).
26. Beside the argument of providing a legal safeguard, economic reasons
also motivate this position; see, e.g., the travaux préparatoires: SOU
1938:44, at 65.
27. The Swedish Constitution states that exoneration is a legal remedy that
ensures a possibility for a post-conviction revision; see Instrument of
Government, Chapter 11 Section 13.
After a judgment in a criminal case has entered into
final force, relief for a substantive defect may be
granted for the benefit of the defendant:
1. if any member of the court, an officer employed at
the court, or the prosecutor, with respect to the
case, is guilty of criminal conduct or neglect of
official duty, or if an attorney, legal representative,
or defence counsel is guilty of an offence with
regard to the case, and the offence or neglect of
duty can be assumed to have affected the outcome
of the case,
2. if any legally qualified judge or the prosecutor has
been disqualified and it is not plain that the dis-
qualification has been without importance as to the
outcome of the case,
3. if a written document presented as evidence was
forged or a witness, expert, or interpreter gave
false testimony and the document or statement can
be assumed to have affected the outcome,
4. if a circumstance or item of evidence that was not
presented previously is invoked and the its [sic!]
presentation probably would have led to the
defendant’s acquittal or that the offence would
have been linked to a sanction provision milder
than that applied, or if in view of the new matter
and other circumstances, extraordinary reasons
warrant a new trial on the issue whether the
defendant committed the offence for which he was
sentenced, or
5. if the application of law forming the basis of the
judgment is manifestly inconsistent with a statuto-
ry provision.28
The most interesting of these legal grounds is the one
concerning new evidence or new circumstances,
particularly since it is presumably the most commonly
invoked legal ground when applying for exoneration.29
Therefore, the present focus is on exoneration due to
new evidence or new circumstances. This legal ground
is usually divided into the main rule and the supplemen-
tal rule.
According to the main rule, an application for exonera-
tion should be granted when the applicant presents a
new circumstance or new evidence that was not invoked
at the previous trial and that would probably have
resulted in either an acquittal or a milder sentence. By
new circumstance or new evidence is meant any fact
28. This is the English translation offered by the Swedish Government, see
Ds 1998:65, at 336, available at www.regeringen.se/49bb67/
contentassets/5503f73d320b4de5bb521dd7ee07500a/the-swedish-
code-of-judicial-procedure (last visited 17 February 2021).
29. This is often stated in Swedish criminal procedural literature; see, e.g.,
L. Welamson and J. Munck, Processen i hovrätt och i Högsta domsto-
len. Rättegång VI (2016), at 193; Fitger et al., above n. 21,
commentary to the Swedish Code on Judicial Procedure, Chapter 58
Section 2; H. Eklund, ‘Processen i hovrätt och i Högsta domstolen’, in B.
Lindell, H. Eklund, P. Asp & T. Andersson (eds.), Straffprocessen (2005)
279, at 338; P.O. Ekelöf and H. Edelstam, Rättsmedlen (2008), at 192.
See also the travaux préparatoires, prop. 1939:307, at 19; SOU
1938:44, at 74, which emphasises that the most common legal ground
for exoneration is assumed to be new circumstances or new evidence.
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that might affect a court’s assessment of the presented
evidence.30 Thus, both dispositive fact and evidentiary
fact can be invoked when filing an application.31 There
might also be a peripheral circumstance that weakens
the reliability of one fact in a chain of evidence.32
The evidence presented must be completely new, in the
sense that it was not presented before a court during the
main hearing.33 Consequently, it is, for example, still
considered a new circumstance or new evidence if it was
present in the pre-trial investigation but not invoked at
the main hearing.34 This is also the case if the new cir-
cumstance or new evidence has been invoked in an
appeal to a higher court but the appeal was not gran-
ted;35 or has been invoked in a previous application for
exoneration, which was denied.36
The requirement that the new circumstance or new
evidence would probably have resulted in either an
acquittal or a milder sentence evidently opens the way
for hypothetical reasoning.37 When deciding whether
the new circumstance or new evidence would ‘probably’
have resulted in a more favourable outcome for the
defendant, the court should not re-examine the evid-
ence. Instead, the court that decides whether an applica-
tion for exoneration should be granted needs to assess
what the outcome of the previous trial would have been
if the evidence had been presented then. Thus, the
assessment should – theoretically – focus on how the
original court would have reasoned if the new circum-
stance or evidence had been presented before that court.
However, the new circumstance or evidence should not
be viewed as isolated from what had previously been
presented but must be considered in the light of the
original evidence. The new evidence must be of such
weight that it questions the previous verdict. The mat-
ter of what weight the new circumstance or evidence
30. See the travaux préparatoires: prop. 1939:307, at 10, 19, 28; SOU
1938:44, at 74.
31. See, e.g., Cars, above n. 8, at 152-69; Ekelöf and Edelstam, above n.
29, at 192; Welamson and Munck, above n. 29, at 199-200; B. Bengts-
son, ‘Resning i brottmål vid synnerliga skäl’, in A. Agell, R. Boman &
N. Jareborg (eds.), Process och exekution. Vänbok till Robert Boman
(1990) 1, at 6-7.
32. See the travaux préparatoires: SOU 1938:44, at 74. See also Bengtsson,
above n. 31, at 6.
33. See the travaux préparatoires: SOU 1938:44, at 573.
34. Ibid., at 573, 575.
35. See, e.g., Supreme Court case NJA 1998 s. 148. Cf. Supreme Court,
decision, 29 December 2016, reference number Ö 5257-15; Supreme
Court, decision, 21 March 2018, reference number Ö 4066-17, where
the Supreme Court in each case granted the application for exonera-
tion. In these two cases, previous applications had been filed but not
granted. The reason that the applicants were able to successfully file a
new application was a combination of new circumstances/evidence and
of what had been referred to in the previous applications. See further,
in Section 3.2.
36. See, e.g., Cars, above n. 8, at 171. See, however, the Esa Teittinen case
and the Kaj Linna case, presented in Section 3.2. In the Esa Teittinen
case, evidence presented in the first application for exoneration was not
considered new in the second (and successful) application, while in the
Kaj Linna case it seems that the two previous unsuccessful applications
for exoneration had some bearing when the Supreme Court granted his
third application.
37. See, e.g., Welamson and Munck, above n. 29, at 205; Bengtsson,
above n. 31, at 2.
should be given is difficult to answer, since this depends
on the circumstances of the individual case. Given these
difficulties, one has to rely on guidelines. Generally, the
stronger and more reliable the original evidence was, the
greater the strength of the new circumstance or evid-
ence must be for the court to grant the application. Con-
versely, the less convincing the original evidence was,
the less weight the new circumstance and evidence
needs to have.38 The latter is obviously questionable,
because if the evidence in the original trial that resulted
in a conviction was less convincing, the court should
probably not have been able to find the defendant guil-
ty. The general statement above was made in the trav-
aux préparatoires and is not developed with examples.
Potentially, this could occur if the original trial were
held many decades ago, when the courts applied a dif-
ferent standard for assessing the evidence. Another pos-
sible example could be a conviction that was based only
on circumstantial evidence. In these situations, it is
understandable that, comparatively, the new circum-
stance or evidence underlying an application for exoner-
ation can be of lesser weight.
An incorrect assessment in the original trial of the (orig-
inal) evidence is no reason for granting an application
for exoneration.39 Additionally, it is not enough that
mitigating circumstances are present or that the new cir-
cumstance or new evidence would result in a milder
sanction within the same range of punishment as that
previously applied by the original court.40
The supplement rule enables the court to grant an
application for exoneration in cases where the require-
ments of the main rule are not met, but where, consider-
ing what the applicant is invoking and other circum-
stances regarding the case, there are extraordinary
reasons to reopen the case. The Swedish Supreme
Court has repeatedly stated that the supplement rule
should be applied restrictively.41 That opinion is also
expressed in the literature.42 However, some authors
emphasise that it is difficult to draw general conclusions
from the Supreme Court cases regarding the supple-
ment rule but that it is possible to conclude that it fol-
lows from the case law of the Supreme Court (before
1990) that the supplement rule is not always applied as
strictly as was originally intended.43
An application based on the supplement rule may be
granted when the circumstances concerning the case are
38. These – perhaps obvious – starting points were stated in the travaux
préparatoires when the current provision was introduced into Swedish
law; see prop 1939:307, at 19, 28; SOU 1938:44, at 74.
39. See, e.g., Welamson and Munck, above n. 29, at 205.
40. See the travaux préparatoires prop. 1939:307, at 13; SOU 1938:44, at
575. See also Ekelöf and Edelstam, above n. 29, at 192; Fitger et al.,
above n. 21, commentary to the Swedish Code on Judicial Procedure,
Chapter 58 Section 2.
41. See, inter alia, the following Supreme Court cases: Supreme Court, deci-
sion, 27 December 2019, reference number Ö 5485-19, para. 12; NJA
2018 s. 163, para. 25; NJA 1992 s. 625, at 626.
42. See, e.g., Cars, above n. 8, at 224-6; Bengtsson, above n. 31, at 4. See
also Welamson and Munck, above n. 29, at 207-8.
43. Bengtsson, above n. 31, at 16. Note that Bengtsson’s article focused
only on cases from the Swedish Supreme Court, which until 1988 was
the only court that decided on applications for exoneration.
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not enough to conclude that they would probably have
led to a different assessment concerning whether the
defendant was guilty but are still enough to cause doubt
about the outcome of the previous judgment. That
might be the case if considerable dissenting opinions
existed between, for example, the district court and the
court of appeal.44 However, it is not enough to grant an
application based on this rule if a case has received a
great deal of media attention or scrutiny.45
The requirement that the supplement rule should be
applied when there are ‘extraordinary reasons’ to reopen
the case means that the defendant must have been found
guilty of a grave crime.46 No guideline is available to
clarify – in this context – what is meant by a grave
crime. However, in extremely rare cases an application
for exoneration might be granted even if the defendant
had received a rather mild sentence.47
If an application is filed to the disadvantage of a defend-
ant who has previously been acquitted, the Swedish Code
of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 58 Section 3, stipulates
the following alternative requirements:
After a judgment in a criminal case has entered into
final force, relief for a substantive defect may be
granted to the detriment of the defendant:
1. if any such condition of the kind referred to in
Section 2, clause 1 or 3, existed and this can be
assumed to have contributed to the defendant’s
acquittal or that the offence was linked to a sanc-
tion provision substantially milder than the one
that should have been applied, or
2. if the offence is punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year and some circumstance or
item of evidence that was not presented previously
is invoked and its presentation probably would
have led to conviction of the defendant for the
offence or that the offence would have been linked
with a sanction provision substantially more severe
than the one applied.
Relief for a substantive defect may not be granted on
the basis stated in clause 2, unless the party shows
probable cause that he was unable to invoke the cir-
cumstance or item of evidence in the court that pro-
nounced the judgment or on appeal therefrom or he
otherwise had a valid excuse for failing to do so.48
44. See the travaux préparatoires: prop. 1939:307, at 28; SOU 1938:44, at
75, 575. However, it has been questioned whether it would be of any
significance. It might, however, illustrate that the case raised difficult
questions regarding the evidence, see Bengtsson, above n. 31, at 14.
45. See, e.g., Bengtsson, above n. 31, at 15-16. Note, however, the men-
tion above in Section 1, that recent applications for exoneration have
been granted in several cases following disclosure by journalists. Thus,
Bengtsson’s 1990 claim may have less bearing than then. Nowadays, it
seems that that the work of a journalist is often needed for enabling a
previously convicted person to successfully apply for exoneration.
46. See the travaux préparatoires: prop. 1939:307, at 28; SOU 1938:44, at
575.
47. See, e.g., the Supreme Court case NJA 1980 s. 550.
48. This is the English translation offered by the Swedish government; see
Ds 1998:65, at 336-7, available at www.regeringen.se/49bb67/
contentassets/5503f73d320b4de5bb521dd7ee07500a/the-swedish-
code-of-judicial-procedure (last visited 17 February 2021).
It is highly unusual for an application for exoneration to
be based on this provision, and when an application is
filed, the most common legal basis is new evidence or
new circumstances.49 Although this provision states a
possibility to apply for exoneration to the disadvantage
of an acquitted defendant, the criteria stated in the pro-
vision limit the possibility to do so. Generally, the
requirements for granting an application based on the
provision are stricter than those for applying to the ben-
efit of the defendant.50
In addition, an application that is based on this provi-
sion must be filed within one year after the situation
underlying the application became known to the appli-
cant (Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 58
Section 4 para. 2). The Supreme Court has stated that
the time limit of one year should be counted in relation
to every item of new evidence or new circumstance.51
Thus, the time frame and other requirements – for
example, that a conviction should have resulted in a
substantially more severe sanction and the limitation to
rather severe crimes – imply that applications for exon-
eration to the disadvantage of a previously acquitted
defendant are regulated rather strictly.
However, a proposal published in 2018 in the Ministry
Publications Series suggests that the possibilities to
apply for exoneration to the disadvantage of a previously
indicted person should be extended. The proposal sug-
gests the introduction of a new legal ground into Swed-
ish law, enabling an application to the disadvantage if
new evidence shows that the previously indicted person
was older than what was claimed in the original trial,
thus resulting in a reduced sentence owing to the age of
the convicted. A corresponding new legal remedy is also
proposed in relation to an application for exoneration in
favour of a previously convicted person; if new evidence
shows that the defendant was actually younger than
assumed at the original trial.52 The proposal has been
49. See, e.g., Ekelöf and Edelstam, above n. 29, at 187-8.
50. See, e.g., the travaux préparatoires prop. 1939:307, at 13, 20; SOU
1938:44, at 74-5, 575; the following Supreme Court cases: NJA 1998
s. 321; NJA 2001 s. 687; NJA 2016 s. 851; NJA 2013 s. 931, at 932-3,
paras. 14, 22; NJA 2020 s. 518, para. 23 and Supreme Court, decision,
17 December 2020, reference number Ö 936-20, para. 15. This posi-
tion is also expressed in the Swedish criminal procedural literature; see,
e.g., Cars, above n. 8, at 215-16.
51. See, e.g., Supreme Court case NJA 1998 s. 321. See, however, Supreme
Court case NJA 2013 s. 931, where witness evidence known to the
prosecutor more than a year before an application to the disadvantage
of a previously acquitted defendant was filed. However, the Supreme
Court stated that the witness evidence had come in another light,
particularly since it brought new insights to the finding of the (new)
main evidence, i.e. the body of the victim had been found. Since the
prosecutor filed the application within one year from this discovery, the
witness evidence was considered new. The Supreme Court has recently
stated that, in a case concerning new DNA analysis, it is necessary to
interpret the one-year limit somewhat differently. The Court stated that
this time period begins when the prosecutor gets the result from the
new DNA analysis; see Supreme Court, decision, 17 December 2020,
reference number Ö 936-20, paras. 8-9.
52. See Ds 2018:19. Note that the age of criminal responsibility is fifteen in
Sweden (Swedish Penal Code, Chapter 1 Section 6) and that Sweden
applies a reduced sentence for juveniles, available for offenders who at
the time of the crime were fifteen years old but under twenty-one years
old (Swedish Penal Code, Chapter 29 Section 7 para. 1). No offender
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criticised on the grounds that it is not necessary since it
is already covered by the current provision.53 Further,
an application for exoneration to the disadvantage is
designed for cases where someone in the original trial
was acquitted; the proposed amendment is based only
on adjusting the sentencing, which diverges from the
rationale and the systematics of the provision.54
2.3 Procedure for Revision in Cases of
Exoneration
The procedure for an application for exoneration is the
same regardless of whether the application was filed by a
previously convicted defendant or by the prosecutor.
Further, except for the aforementioned one-year limita-
tion, the same procedural rules apply regardless of
whether the application is to the benefit or to the
disadvantage of the defendant.
Only a written application can be considered (Swedish
Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 58 Section 4 para. 1),
and it should be submitted to a court. If the judgment
was pronounced by a district court, the application
should be submitted to the (relevant) court of appeal,
and if by a court of appeal, it should be submitted to the
Supreme Court (Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure,
Chapter 58 Section 4 para. 1).55 The latter also applies if
the judgment was pronounced by the Supreme Court.
The court procedure is only written. However, if found
necessary for the investigation, the court can decide that
a party or a third party should be examined.56 However,
this rarely occurs.
As mentioned earlier, the application can be filed either
by a previously convicted defendant or by the prosecu-
tor. When the prosecutor files, any general prosecutor
can apply to the court of appeal. However, if an applica-
tion needs to be filed to the Supreme Court, the Prose-
under the age of twenty-one can be sentenced to life imprisonment
(Swedish Penal Code, Chapter 29 Section 7 para. 2). However, a gov-
ernmental inquiry has proposed that the reduced sentence for juveniles
over the age of eighteen should be abolished; see SOU 2018:85. Cur-
rently (mid-February 2021), neither the proposal on amending the pro-
visions on exoneration nor the proposal on abolishing the reduced sen-
tence for juveniles has (yet) resulted in an amendment of the law.
53. See, e.g., Supreme Court case NJA 2020 s. 134, where the Court gran-
ted an application for exoneration in favour of the applicant, since the
Court concluded that the applicant was probably younger than what
was assumed at the original trial.
54. See the consultation response from the Faculty of Law, Stockholm
University, 26 September 2018, available at www.regeringen.se/
4a7b38/contentassets/3192961dcccc41bd9c812275643f1cc2/
stockholms-universitet-juridiska-fakultetsnamnden.pdf (last visited
17 February 2021). See also the consultation response from the Swed-
ish Bar Association, 26 September 2018, available at
www.regeringen.se/4a7b38/contentassets/
3192961dcccc41bd9c812275643f1cc2/sveriges-advokatsamfund.pdf
(last visited 17 February 2021).
55. As a main rule, when the Supreme Court decides whether the applica-
tion for exoneration should be granted, at least five justices of the
Supreme Court must participate (the Swedish Code of Judicial Proce-
dure, Chapter 3 Section 5 para. 1 point 5). The main rule for the court
of appeal is that three legally trained judges must participate in the
decision (the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 2 Section 4
para. 1).
56. The Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 58 Section 6 para. 2,
Chapter 56 Section 11 para. 1 and Chapter 52 Section 11 para. 1.
cutor General must file the petition.57 Note that Swed-
ish law allows for the prosecutor and the Prosecutor
General to file an application for exoneration in favour
of a defendant who has previously been convicted.
When filing an application for exoneration, the appli-
cant must specify the challenged judgment, the basis of
and supporting reasons for the application, the evidence
that the applicant desires to invoke and what he or she
seeks to prove with each particular item of evidence
(Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 58 Sec-
tion 5 para. 1).
An application for exoneration cannot be granted unless
it has been served upon the opposing party, who will be
directed to file a written explanation in relation to the
application. However, if the opposing party is the prose-
cutor, the application can be forwarded to the prosecu-
tor without service (Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure,
Chapter 58 Section 6 para. 1). The court can immedi-
ately reject an unfounded application and can dismiss an
application without notifying the opposing party (Swed-
ish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 58 Section 6
para. 1).
Additionally, Swedish law requires that the prosecutor
must, in certain situations, resume the pre-trial investi-
gation. These rules were introduced into Swedish law in
2012.58 First, this shall be done if an application for
exoneration contains new evidence or new circum-
stances not previously presented and if it is probable
that there exists a legal ground for exoneration (Swedish
Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 58 Section 6A). A
pre-trial investigation should not be resumed if there is
no need for investigative measures. Secondly, the court
that decides whether the application should be granted
can order the prosecutor to take certain investigative
actions. This requires that the mentioned prerequisites
are fulfilled. The court can decide that an ongoing pre-
trial investigation should also include an inquiry con-
cerning the previous defendant’s participation in the
crime (Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 58
Section 6B). Alongside these provisions, the previous
defendant should be provided with a defence counsel if
a pre-trial investigation is resumed according to these
provisions (Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chap-
ter 21 Section 3B).
If an application for exoneration is denied, the binding
effect of the judgment will remain in force,59 and, thus,
the outcome of the final verdict will be upheld. How-
ever, Swedish law does not limit the number of times an
application for exoneration can be filed.60
57. It follows from the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 7 Sec-
tion 4 para. 3, that the Prosecutor General is the public prosecutor at
the Supreme Court.
58. See, further, the travaux préparatoires: prop. 2011/12:156.
59. On the matter of the binding effect of the judgment, see Section 2.1.2.
60. This is also possible if an application for exoneration is granted and a
new trial is held but the outcome of the new trial confirms the original
judgment. Although this is highly unusual, there are cases that illustrate
this possibility. One example is that of Bertil Ströberg, who, in 1983,
was convicted of gross espionage. He claimed that he was wrongfully
convicted and applied several times for exoneration. The Swedish
Supreme Court granted one application in 1988, but the new trial, in
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If an application for exoneration is approved, the case is
reopened, and the already decided case is brought before
a court again. However, approval of an application for
exoneration does not quash the original and final judg-
ment. Instead, approval means that the binding effect of
the original and final judgment no longer prevents the
case from being reopened and being decided anew by a
court.61 Therefore one might claim that since a decision
to approve an application for exoneration results in a
review of the case, it resembles an appeal.62
An approved application should, as a main rule, result in
a new trial. This should be held at the court that last
adjudicated in the case (Swedish Code of Judicial Proce-
dure, Chapter 58 Section 7 para. 1). Until a new judg-
ment has been pronounced, the original judgment is still
valid. Consequently, a person who has previously been
convicted and sentenced to jail will continue to serve
time in prison until a new judgment has been pro-
nounced.63
From the main rule it follows that the court trying the
case again should hold a new main hearing. However, if
the main hearing includes comprehensive verbal evid-
ence, the case may be remanded to a lower court. Thus,
a new trial intended for the court of appeal may be
remanded to the district court. The main hearing will
then take place at the district court, which will then pro-
nounce a judgment, which can, of course, be appealed
against according to the standard procedure.
When a case is reopened and a new trial is being held,
the case is reviewed in full.64 According to the standard
procedure, all aspects (i.e. guilt, evaluation of evidence,
sentence) of the previous judgment are reviewed. In the
majority of granted applications for exoneration, the
case as such is reviewed. Yet there are cases where an
application for exoneration is granted partly, e.g. if the
original judgment concerned several offences, but the
(approved) application concerned only one of them.
Additionally, when granting an application for exonera-
tion, the court can limit the extent of what is being
reviewed. It is therefore possible that a review covers
only the sentence, not the question of whether the
defendant was guilty.65
However, as an exception, the court approving the
application for exoneration may instead – where the
application was filed for the benefit of the defendant –
change the original judgment immediately. The prereq-
uisite for changing the original judgment by, for
1989, at the court of appeal ended in a guilty verdict. In 2009, Ströberg
again filed an application, but the Supreme Court turned this down in
2011.
61. This follows from the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 58
Section 7 para. 1. See also the travaux préparatoires: SOU 1938:44, at
578.
62. See, e.g., Ekelöf and Edelstam, above n. 29, at 196.
63. However, according to the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chap-
ter 58 Section 6 para. 3, the court may inhibit the enforcement of the
judgment.
64. This follows from the wording of the Swedish Code of Judicial Proce-
dure, Chapter 58 Section 7 para. 1.
65. See, e.g., Supreme Court case NJA 1976 s. 288, where the application
for exoneration was granted part in the sense that the review only con-
cerned the sentence.
example, dismissing the action is that “the matter is
found to be obvious” (Swedish Code of Judicial Proce-
dure, Chapter 58 Section 7 para. 1). It is highly unusual
for a court to find the matter ‘obvious’, and a majority of
approved applications for exoneration will proceed
according to the main rule.66
3 Revision in Practice
3.1 Official Statistics on the Number of
Applications for Exoneration Is Not
Available
While some countries, for example Norway,67 provide
official statistics concerning the procedure of post-con-
viction review processes, there are no official statistics
concerning how the Swedish criminal justice system
operationalises, inter alia, applications for exoneration.68
Although official statistics on this matter are not
available or presented in a synthesised manner, there is a
way to assess the number and characteristics of applica-
tions handled within the Swedish criminal justice
system, namely by simply asking the courts to provide
all the case files concerning application for exoneration.
This is, of course, time-consuming since it requires col-
lecting the applications and analysing them in detail.69
For these reasons, empirical data on the number of
applications that pass through the Swedish courts has
not been gathered for the present review. However, a
study published in 2017 presented empirical data from
one year (2015).70
That study found that 383 applications were decided by
the Supreme Court and the courts of appeal. For
66. See, e.g., the travaux préparatoires: SOU 2015:52, at 66.
67. See the Norwegian Criminal Cases Review Commission (Kommisjonen
for gjenopptakelse av straffesaker), which annually presents empirical
data on the post-conviction review process in Norway. In 2019 the Nor-
wegian Commission received 153 applications to reopen cases and a
total of 131 cases were concluded. The Commission reopened 11 cases,
which represent an approval rate of 9%; see the Norwegian Commis-
sion’s Annual Report 2019, available in English at
www.gjenopptakelse.no/fileadmin/user_upload/
Aarsrapport_2019_engelsk.pdf (last visited 17 February 2021), at 3.
Note that the approval rate of reopened cases for all the years in which
the Commission has existed is 15%.
68. Previously, it was easier to obtain official statistics. Until 1988 an appli-
cation for exoneration had to be filed to the Swedish Supreme Court,
regardless of which court had pronounced the judgment. This made it
possible to gather statistics from the Supreme Court. A project initiated
by the Office of the Chancellor of Justice showed that between 1950
and 1988, 40-60 applications for exoneration every ten years were
approved. The most common legal ground for approving an application
was new evidence or new circumstances; see Felaktigt dömda. Rapport
från JK:s rättssäkerhetsprojekt (2006), at 96, 103-15. See also Cars,
above n. 8, at 316-19, who provides statistics between 1935 and 1958
and who illustrates figures almost similar to the above. See also the
travaux préparatoires: prop. 1939:307, Ann. D, at 55, showing that
between 1936 and 1938 very few applications for exoneration were
granted each year. Thus, during the period when the Supreme Court
was the only court instance handling applications for exoneration, the
approval rate seems to be rather consistent.
69. However, the problems in gathering the relevant case files are far more
complicated; see, further, Hellqvist, above n. 9, at 149-50.
70. Ibid., at 131-53.
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reasons explained further in the study, some applica-
tions were excluded,71 leaving a detailed analysis of 216
applications. The result was that, of these, “209 applica-
tions were rejected and seven applications were
approved. This represents a 3% approval rate”.72 The
Supreme Court decided on a majority of the applica-
tions (79%)73 and the most common invoked legal
ground being new evidence or new circumstances.74
The study also showed that the characteristics of the
seven approved applications were rather disparate: two
concerned road traffic offences, two concerned driving
under the influence of narcotics or alcohol, one assault,
one tax offences and false accounting offences, and one
concerned involuntary manslaughter.75
Although the study examined the number of applica-
tions and their characteristics during only one year, thus
raising questions of representativeness, it provides some
information on the number of applications that pass
through the Swedish courts. Lacking other available
data, it provides an important insight in regard to the
number, the characteristics and the outcome of the
review process in these cases.
3.2 Examples of Granted Applications for
Exoneration from Swedish Case Law
From the previous sections, it is evident that Swedish
law restrictively allows the court to grant an application
for exoneration. Since there is a lack of official data and
a narrow scope for granting an application, this section
will highlight some examples of successful applications.
Since very few applications are granted annually, it is
difficult to find representative cases. In order to illus-
trate successful applications, this section reviews three
cases. It should be noted that they have some common
features. The three applicants were originally convicted
of murder. Further, these cases could be viewed as
high-profile cases, well known to both lawyers and the
general public in Sweden. In two of the cases, the appli-
cants had previously, unsuccessfully, applied for exon-
eration.
A case worth mentioning is the one concerning Samir
Sabri, who at the age of fifteen confessed to the murder
of his stepmother. He was convicted by a district court
in 1986, and the guilty verdict was based on his confes-
sion.76 He was sentenced to institutional psychiatric
care. Although he withdrew his confession a few years
later, an application for exoneration was filed in 2015 to
the Svea Court of Appeal. At the same time, the pre-tri-
al investigation was reopened. The invoked legal ground
was new circumstances and evidence, which consisted of
the withdrawal of the confession, some new witness tes-
timony and evidence suggesting that the forensic evid-
ence presented at the 1986 trial – for example, the pres-
71. Ibid., at 139-40.
72. Ibid., at 141.
73. Ibid., at 141.
74. Ibid., at 142. Note that in eighty-one of the applications no legal
ground or an unclear ground was made.
75. Ibid., at 143-4, 145-8.
76. Stockholm District Court, judgment, 1 October 1986, reference number
B 322-86.
ence and locations of bloodstains on his clothes – was
not compatible with Samir’s confession. Additionally,
he now stated that his father committed the murder and
that his father told him to confess. Samir claimed that
his father compelled him to confess so that the father
would not be indicted and thereby risk a jail sentence.
In 2016, Svea Court of Appeal granted the application,
although it stated that a modified statement from a pre-
viously convicted defendant should generally be
assessed with some caution. The court emphasised that
the withdrawal of the confession and the modified state-
ment were supported by new forensic evidence and in
line with witness testimonies.77 Following the standard
procedure, a new trial was held at the district court,
which found Samir not guilty.78
Another example of a successful application is the case
of Esa Teittinen, who had allegedly killed his seventy-
year-old friend by drowning him in a bathtub. Although
no crime scene investigation was conducted and it was
not possible to identify the cause of death, Esa was, in
2010, convicted of murder by an appeals court and was
sentenced to fifteen years in prison.79 He filed the first
application for exoneration in 2014, but the Supreme
Court did not grant this application.80 A second applica-
tion was filed in 2017.
The previous application consisted of statements from
scientific experts, concluding that the original forensic
medical examination was faulty and that the cause of
death was still unclear. In the second application similar
statements, providing the same conclusions, supported
the new application. A new reconstruction, presenting
an alternative course of events, was also attached to the
application. The new reconstruction used figures of
similar height and weight to the victim’s and Esa’s. A
bathtub of the same size as in the victim’s flat was used.
From this, it could not be excluded that the victim
could have drowned without external force from anoth-
er person. The new reconstruction was presented in
both a film and in photographs shot from different
angles. At the original trial, a reconstruction had also
been presented. However, that reconstruction was only
presented in two photographs (of bad quality), and the
figure playing the victim was heavier than the victim.
Thus, the original reconstruction was faulty in several
regards.
In 2018, the Supreme Court approved the 2017 applica-
tion. The court stated that the experts in the second
application presented the same conclusions as in the
first application. Since the conclusions did not differ
from the first application, it could not be considered as
new evidence.81 However, the Court concluded that the
77. Svea Court of Appeal, decision, 7 April 2016, reference number
Ö 7110-15.
78. Stockholm District Court, judgment, 13 December 2016, reference
number B 4343-16.
79. Svea Court of Appeal, judgment, 21 October 2010, reference number
B 6903-10.
80. Supreme Court, decision, 4 September 2014, reference number
Ö 2666-14.
81. Supreme Court, decision, 21 March 2018, reference number
Ö 4066-17, paras. 30-2.
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new reconstruction was considered new evidence. The
Court also emphasised that the new reconstruction
raised questions about the conclusions drawn from the
original reconstruction. The Court also stated that the
case contained peculiar circumstances, and it raised con-
cerns regarding the rule of law. It concluded that ‘extra-
ordinary reasons’ warranted a new trial. Thus, the
Court approved the application based on the supple-
ment rule (see Section 2.2).82 Following standard proce-
dure, a new trial was held at the appeals court, which
found Esa not guilty.83
The third successful case is the one of Kaj Linna. He
was convicted, in 2005, of one case of murder, one case
of gross robbery and one case of theft. The crime occur-
red at the home of two brothers. The appeals court sen-
tenced him to life imprisonment.84 The conviction
depended largely on the testimony of one witness. The
witness claimed that Kaj had said that he was planning a
robbery of the two brothers’ home. He also claimed that
Kaj and himself, the day before the crime, drove near
the two brothers’ home intending to prevent Kaj from
committing a crime. The evidence in the original trial
further consisted of an analysis of the telephone traffic
between, inter alia, Kaj and the witness.
Kaj had previously filed two unsuccessful applications
for exoneration to the Supreme Court.85 A third appli-
cation was filed in 2015. To understand the third appli-
cation, it is necessary to summarise the previous appli-
cations.
The first application emphasised that analysis of the
witness’s telephone traffic showed no connection to a
base station near the two brothers’ home on the date and
at the time that the witness claimed that he and Kaj
were driving there. The Supreme Court noted that this
evidence supported the unlikelihood that the witness
was where he claimed to be. The Supreme Court con-
cluded that the court of appeal did not seem to have
assessed this circumstance at the original trial. It was
thus not a circumstance affecting the original outcome.86
In the decision on the second application, the Supreme
Court stated that the Court’s 2006 decision was that the
matter of the telephone connections was insignificant in
relation to the outcome of the original trial. Kaj also
presented a reconstruction of the course of events. The
Court concluded that both the previous and the new
evidence gave no reason to approve the application.
However, two of five justices of the Supreme Court dis-
sented, concluding that there were indeed ‘extraordina-
ry reasons’ to warrant a new trial. The main reason was
82. Supreme Court, decision, 21 March 2018, reference number
Ö 4066-17, paras. 33-8.
83. Svea Court of Appeal, judgment, 7 September 2018, reference number
B 2860-18.
84. Upper Norrland Court of Appeal, judgment, 1 March 2005, reference
number B 49-05.
85. Supreme Court, decision, 5 December 2006, reference number
Ö 2734-06; Supreme Court, decision, 21 October 2010, reference
number Ö 1797-09.
86. Supreme Court, decision, 5 December 2006, reference number
Ö 2734-06.
that the conviction relied heavily on the testimony of
one witness, whose credibility could be questioned.87
The third application presented new circumstances con-
sisting of contradicting the testimony of the witness
from the original trial. The witness had to journalists
provided new information, which differed from what
the witness stated at the original trial. The new infor-
mation from the witness had been recorded. The new
information gave a rather different explanation to what
and when crucial events had occurred. Other new evid-
ence that was used to support this application was a
comparison with another case of robbery where the vic-
tim was killed.
The Supreme Court held that the new evidence con-
cerning the witness raised questions of his credibility,
but the Court stated that the statement from the witness
now made to journalists was – both when assessed solely
by itself and together with the previous applications –
not enough to grant the application. Yet the Court stat-
ed that the “circumstances of the case is rather peculiar”
and that the previous applications (also) contained evid-
ence that could question the credibility of the witness.
However, considering that a minority of the judges in
the second application assessed that the application
should be granted, a minor addition of new evidence
could be sufficient to grant the application. Thus, the
Supreme Court concluded that ‘extraordinary reasons’
warranted a new trial.88 The Court approved the appli-
cation based on the supplement rule (see Section 2.2).
Following standard procedure, a new trial was held at
the appeals court, which resulted in an acquittal.89 Kaj
Linna spent 13 years in prison. Until the present day,
this is the longest time a person, who was later exoner-
ated, has been imprisoned in Sweden.
One feature deserving some discussion is the multiple
applications, and the Kaj Linna case is particularly
interesting in this regard. An examination of the third
application would show that it was supported mainly by
successive (new) circumstances, most of which were
already known in the two previous unsuccessful applica-
tions. Except from again, but with some new evidence,
questioning the credibility of the witness, the third
application did not really invoke any new evidence. A
possible explanation for the Supreme Court’s approval
could be that the Court considered that the questioning
of the credibility of the witness – in the light of what
had been invoked in the previous applications – was
considered new. Therefore, what was now presented
was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Yet when
approving the third application, the Supreme Court
emphasised that what the witness had stated to journal-
ists was not enough to grant the application. Thus, it is
rather peculiar that the Court rejected the only new
evidence, and it seems that the previous applications
87. Supreme Court, decision, 21 October 2010, reference number
Ö 1797-09.
88. Supreme Court, decision, 29 December 2016, reference number
Ö 45257-15, paras. 17-24.
89. Upper Norrland Court of Appeal, judgment, 15 June 2017, reference
number B 1138-16.
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had a greater impact on the Court’s approval rather than
the new evidence invoked.
Moreover, a key factor in these three successful applica-
tions, eventually resulting in an acquittal, seems to be
the involvement of (both) journalists and lawyers. The
Samir Sabri case was scrutinised by both a journalist
and a lawyer,90 the Kaj Linna case had been scrutinised
more than ten years prior to the new trial by a journalist
who was later followed by other investigative journal-
ists.91 And several lawyers were engaged in the different
applications for exoneration. The Esa Teittinen case
received some media attention; however, it was not
scrutinised by journalists in the same way as the two
other cases, and the successful application depended
entirely on the work of lawyers.92 The three cases illus-
trate that a successful application seemingly depends on
having access to proper resources – preferably a combi-
nation of investigative journalists and engaging lawyers.




A challenge concerning the post-conviction review pro-
cess in Sweden is the lack of official statistics. It has
been pointed out that this limits the understanding of
how the Swedish justice system operates when adminis-
trating applications for exoneration.93 It should be noted
that Sweden does maintain official data on other aspects
of the Swedish criminal justice systems; for example,
the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention col-
lects data and continuously publishes statistics on
reported crimes. The Council also offers statistics on
the number of indicted persons and data on different
offences. Thus, it is rather peculiar that Sweden does
not offer statistics on the post-conviction review pro-
cess.94
90. See above n. 4.
91. The first journalist to investigate the case more deeply (in 2006) was
Stefan Lisinski at Dagens Nyheter; he kept examining the case during
the entire process. In 2015, the journalists Anton Berg and Martin John-
son examined the case in detail in their podcast ‘Spår’ and found new
evidence.
92. The journalist Katarina Lagerwall at Dagens Nyheter was contacted by
Esa Teittinen in May 2017, and in July 2017 she wrote a longer article,
examining the case, and the second application for exoneration was
filed in August 2017. After the approval, she continued to write about
the case.
93. Hellqvist, above n. 9, at 149-50. See also S. Hellqvist and M. Lidén,
‘Det behövs mer kunskap om resning i brottmål’, Dagens Nyheter
Debatt, 14 January 2017.
94. Note that the problem is not that it is impossible to collect data from
the courts. As Hellqvist points out, there are several practical problems
for someone who wants to present official statistics. For example, the
data must be collected at several courts, which categorise the applica-
tions differently. Another issue is that the courts differ in their archiving
procedures. See Hellqvist, above n. 9, at 149.
Providing statistics on this matter is important, since it
is a way of removing the current ‘blank spot’. Doing so
would also be the beginning of more in-depth research,
where the statistics on the post-conviction review pro-
cess (including exoneration) could be scrutinised in
detail. It would allow researchers to, inter alia, analyse
variations in the number of granted cases and explain
long-term variations in the administration of applica-
tions for exoneration. Another important aspect to ana-
lyse would be whether there is a correlation between the
current criminal law policy and the characteristics of the
granted applications for exoneration. Yet another reason
to provide for official statistics is that it would enable
comparative studies, in which variations between juris-
dictions with different legal cultures and different core
characteristics in their criminal justice system can be
analysed further.95
When reviewing the application procedure, one feature
deserving critique is that an approved application will
result in a reopening of the case and a new trial, which
shall be held at the court that last adjudicated in the
case. From the applicant’s perspective, this might seem
problematic, since this court originally convicted the
applicant. Therefore, an applicant might perceive that
the court in which the new trial is being held – to some
extent – is biased. This could, of course, be solved by,
for example, introducing a new rule stating that the
reopened case should be referred to a different court
than the one that last adjudicated the case.96
A related issue is that the Supreme Court administers
and decides on a majority of the applications for exoner-
ation.97 This means that an appeals court adjudicated
the case. One can assume that the judgment is often
appealed against. However, the Swedish Supreme Court
is a court of precedent and adjudicates only if the Court
has granted an application for a review permit.98 Within
the ordinary proceedings, the Court may grant a review
permit if there exist grounds for exoneration (Swedish
Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 54 Section 10
para. 1).99 From the applicant’s perspective, this might
seem problematic, since it might be perceived as the
95. See, e.g., M. Killias, ‘Errors Occur Everywhere – But Not at the Same
Frequency: The Role of Procedural Systems in Wrongful Convictions’, in
R.C. Huff and M. Killias (eds.), Wrongful Convictions and Miscarriages
of Justice. Causes and Remedies in North American and European
Criminal Justice Systems (2013) 61. Killias seems to suggest that the
differences between the core characteristics of various criminal justice
systems might offer one explanation of why the numbers of (granted)
applications for exoneration vary. Thus, one cannot focus solely on
extraordinary legal remedies when comparing different jurisdictions;
one also needs to consider the legal culture and the core characteristics
of various countries.
96. See, for example, the Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act, Section 400.
97. See Section 3.1.
98. Annually, the Court approves only approximately 2% of these applica-
tions. On the role and function of the Swedish Supreme Court, see,
e.g., Welamson and Munck, above n. 29, at 129-67.
99. The Supreme Court rarely grants a review permit based on extraordina-
ry reasons, such as exoneration. See, however, Supreme Court case NJA
2019 s. 438, where the Court (within an ordinary appeal) granted a
review permit on the grounds that there existed reasons to approve an
application for exoneration to the disadvantage of the defendant. New
evidence and new circumstances had been discovered after the pro-
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Court – in its decision not to grant a review permit –
thereby also having decided on the issue of exoneration.
Thus, if a previously convicted person later files an
application for exoneration, the applicant might pre-
sume that the Court has already positioned itself in this
regard. Note that no specific provision hinders, for
example, a justice of the Supreme Court that participa-
ted in the decision not to grant a review permit from lat-
er participating in the decision on whether to grant the
application for exoneration.100 This could also – again
from the applicant’s perspective – be perceived as the
Court not being objective when administering an appli-
cation for exoneration. Although some applicants might
perceive this procedure as somewhat biased, it is, of
course, a positive feature that the Supreme Court within
the ordinary procedure might grant a review permit
owing to the existence of grounds for exoneration.
Thereby, wrongful convictions could be corrected effi-
ciently within the ordinary procedure. But this does not
solve the situation where a justice of the Supreme Court
has participated in the decision not to grant a review
permit and later participates in the decision concerning
exoneration. This issue could be addressed by introduc-
ing a main rule that hinders a justice of the Supreme
Court from, later, also deciding whether to grant an
application for exoneration.
Another challenge with the post-conviction review pro-
cess in Sweden is that a convicted person applying for
exoneration seemingly needs to have access to resources.
From the cases mentioned in Section 3.2, one could
claim that a successful application depends largely on
the involvement of lawyers and journalists.101 Although
it should be emphasised that the number of cases men-
tioned earlier, in Section 3.2, is low, it is evident that a
key factor in each of these cases was the involvement of
both lawyers and journalists. One could, of course,
argue that the limited number of cases cannot be enough
to draw general conclusions from them. Yet one has to
remember that only a handful of applications for exon-
ceedings at the court of appeal but before the binding effect of the
judgment entered.
100. However, if it is a question of multiple applications for, inter alia, exon-
eration, the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 3 Section 7,
provides against the participation of a justice of the Supreme Court in a
decision on whether to grant a renewed application for exoneration.
Note that this applies if “a sufficient number of justices is nevertheless
available in the Court”. This provision should be viewed as making it
possible for a justice of the Supreme Court that decided on the matter
of the review permit to participate in the decision on exoneration. How-
ever, it follows from general rules and principles that a judge should
avoid handling a case that he or she has already dealt with. For related
case law on the matter of multiple applications for exoneration, see,
further, Supreme Court case NJA 1986 s. 666.
101. Note that the involvement of journalists does not necessarily result in an
approval of an application for exoneration. In 2019 the case of Son Do
was examined by the journalists Anton Berg and Martin Johnson in their
podcast ‘Spår’. The defendant was convicted of murder in 2006 and
was sentenced by an appeals court to life imprisonment. The journalists
found new circumstances concerning, inter alia, the photo confronta-
tion and the interrogation of a child who was the key witness in the
case. In 2020, the Supreme Court rejected the application for exonera-
tion, stating – without further reasoning – that no legal ground for
exoneration existed in the case; see Supreme Court, decision, 9 Decem-
ber 2020, reference number Ö 5104-19.
erations are granted annually. Thus, it is generally a
problem to present a number of cases from which gener-
al conclusions can be drawn. Further, in all of the cases
presented in Section 3.2 the indictment concerned mur-
der. One could argue that the legal safeguards put in
place are particularly crucial when the defendant is
charged with a serious offence. Therefore, it is worth
highlighting that when the indictment concerns a seri-
ous offence, a successful application seems to require
access to resources.
From the cases reviewed in Section 3.2, it seems that a
person claiming that he or she is wrongfully convicted,
in order to file a successful application, (first) needs to
engage a journalist who scrutinises the previous convic-
tion in detail, which can later be used in the formal
application for exoneration written by a lawyer. Gener-
ally, a lawyer does not necessarily have the means and
time to fully investigate the previous case in detail.
Thus, the lawyer does not have the means to review the
case and create a story in the same way that a journalist
can; meanwhile, a journalist does not have the legal
skills to put together an application in a way that would
adhere to the language of the court. The combination of
the work of a journalist and a lawyer is – at least based
on the reviewed cases – seemingly needed. Con-
sequently, one could argue that it is almost impossible
for an applicant who lacks the resources (i.e. access to a
journalist and/or lawyer) to have a fair chance of suc-
cessfully applying for exoneration. One cannot exclude
the possibility that although there exist cases that meet
the requirements for granting an application, the appli-
cant has been unable to express him- or herself in the
correct legal language.102
Although the number of cases presented in Section 3.2
is limited, they concern grave crimes (murder) that –
arguably – require greater respect for the existing legal
safeguards, and in two of the cases several applications
were required before the court granted the applications.
The combination of these factors is interesting in that it
indicates some deficiencies with the current Swedish
model of administering applications for exoneration,
raising the question whether this model, where an appli-
cation for exoneration is administered within the court
system, should be reformed by introducing a review
committee.
Recently, some authors have suggested that Sweden
should reform the current model by (at least consider-
ing) replacing it with a review committee.103 Those in
102. See also Lidén et al., above n. 11, at 353 (footnote 72), who, on scruti-
nising a number of applications for exoneration, found that 1,014 out
of 1,330 (declined) applications were filed without any legal assistance.
See also Hellqvist, above n. 9, at 151, concluding that the applicants
included in her study showed that a majority of the applications were
written by hand and without legal assistance. This illustrates the difficul-
ties in putting together an application that will meet the legal require-
ments for granting an application for exoneration.
103. See Lidén et al., above n. 11, at 354-6. Others have suggested that
official statistics need to be provided first, and, depending on what the
official data shows, it could be relevant to consider reforming the cur-
rent Swedish model of administering applications for exoneration; see
Hellqvist, above n. 9, at 153. The demand for an independent organ to
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favour of introducing such a committee often refer to
Norway, which established a review committee in
2001.104 It should be noted that in the Nordic region,105
a legal comparison between the neighbouring countries
is rather common. A legal reform in a Nordic country
(in any legal area) is commonly inspired or influenced
by the regulation in place in another Nordic country.
There are, of course, many reasons why comparisons are
often made between these countries, but to mention a
few, these countries have a similar (legal) culture, a sim-
ilar law-making process, an emphasis on the written law
and where the travaux préparatoires is viewed as an
important legal source for the court when interpreting
the written law and they are all considered welfare state
regimes. Another aspect that promotes inter-Nordic
comparisons is the language. The Swedish, Norwegian
and Danish languages are similar, and thus legal sources
are readable in their original language, thereby (also)
making it easier to recognise and understand the termi-
nology used as well as important legal concepts. Fur-
ther, the Nordic countries cooperate closely in various
matters, including criminal procedural law. Thus, for
the purposes of the present review, it is worth referenc-
ing – albeit briefly – how applications for exoneration
are administered in Norway, in particular the level of
independence of the Norwegian Criminal Cases Review
Commission.
Before turning to the role of the Norwegian Criminal
Cases Review Commission, it should be noted that a few
high-profile cases, concerning serious offences, promp-
ted the reform that resulted in the creation of the Nor-
wegian Commission. In particular, one (in)famous case
– the Liland case – is often referred to as groundbreak-
ing for the introduction of the Norwegian Cases Review
Commission. In brief, in 1969 the defendant was con-
victed for two cases of murder and sentenced for life
with 10 years supervision. After his release, he success-
fully applied for exoneration, and when the case was
tried anew at the appeals court, in 1994, it ended in an
acquittal.106
administer applications for exoneration is not new. As early as in 1937,
a member of the Swedish Parliament proposed that Sweden should
introduce a system with an independent institution for operating the
post-conviction review process. It was proposed that a preparatory
committee administer applications for exoneration and forward to the
Supreme Court those that it deemed met the criteria for reopening. It
was suggested that the committee would apply to the Supreme Court
to grant the petition to reopen the case. Further, the Supreme Court
would be able to dismiss a petition only for extraordinary reasons. See
motion by Vilhelm Lundstedt, Second Chamber of the Parliament,
motion nr 98, 1937. The motion did not result in any changes in this
regard; see further First Chamber of the Parliament, Opinion nr 9,
1937; SOU 1938:44, at 71-2.
104. For a background, see the Norwegian travaux préparatoires: Ot. prp.
nr 70 (2000-2001). The amendment introducing the Norwegian Crim-
inal Cases Review entered into force on 1 January 2004.
105. The Nordic countries consist of Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway,
Iceland, Greenland, the Faroe Islands and the Åland Islands.
106. For a more thorough review of the Liland case in English, see, e.g.,
U. Stridbeck and S. Magnussen ‘Prevention of Wrongful Convictions:
Norwegian Legal Safeguards and the Criminal Cases Review Commis-
sion’, 80 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1373 (2012), at
1386-1388. Note that the Liland case resulted in a government inquiry
The high-profile cases prompting the reform in Norway
could also explain why the main reason for creating the
Norwegian Criminal Cases Review Commission was to
increase trust in the post-conviction review process.107
This is also a valid argument in the Swedish context. A
review committee could, for example, provide more
transparent guidelines as to how the application should
be outlined,108 thereby increasing the number of
potentially successful applications. Additionally, a
review committee could – from the applicant’s perspec-
tive – be perceived as more objective than a model in
which applications for exonerations are administered
within the court system. Further, a review committee
could – like in Norway – provide official statistics,
which would increase the transparency of the review
process. Thus, there is a strong call for introducing a
review committee in Sweden, in particular since it
would significantly improve the transparency of how
applications for exoneration are handled.
Although an introduction of a review committee would
improve some features of the current Swedish model of
administering applications for exoneration, it would not
be unproblematic to establish a Swedish review commit-
tee. First, it would require an amendment of the Swed-
ish constitution. According to the Instrument of Govern-
ment, Chapter 11 Section 13, the Supreme Court or
another court that is not an administrative court, shall
administer an application for exoneration. The key word
in this provision is ‘court’; since a review committee
would not be considered a court, an amendment would
be necessary.109 Secondly, it raises some principal ques-
tions concerning whether a ‘system on the side’ (a
review committee) per se is preferable to one in which
that scrutinised the case, see NOU 1996:15, and several aspects of the
case were discussed in the travaux préparatoires which established the
Norwegian Criminal Cases Review Commission; see Ot. prp. nr 70
(2000-2001), at 85-97, where the Norwegian government mainly
presented, inter alia, some amendments regarding provisions on crim-
inal procedural law.
107. See, e.g., the Norwegian travaux préparatoires: Ot. prp. nr 70
(2000-2001), at 30-2. See also Etterkontroll av kommisjonen for gje-
nopptakelse av straffesaker. Rapport fra arbeidsgruppe for etterkontroll
av Gjenopptakelseskommisjonen, Justis-og beredskapsdepartementet,
2012, at 114. Generally, the establishment of the Norwegian Criminal
Cases Review Commission seems to have been successful; see, e.g., U.
Stridbeck and S. Magnussen, ‘Opening Potentially Wrongful Convic-
tions – Look to Norway’, 58 Criminal Law Quarterly 267 (2012); Strid-
beck and Magnussen, above n. 106. For an overview of the regulation
of the Norwegian Criminal Cases Review, see E. Keiserud, K.E. Sœther,
M. Holmboe, H-P. Jahre, M. Matningsdal & J.G. Smørdal, Straffepro-
sessloven. Lov 22. Maj 1981 nr. 25 om rettergangsmåten i straffesaker.
Lovkommentar. Bind II (2020), at 1412-1449; J. Andenœs and
T-G. Myhrer, Norsk straffeprosess (2009), at 572-86.
108. The Norwegian Criminal Cases Review Commission has a duty to pro-
vide guidance for applicants, and it will establish contact with the appli-
cant. The Commission can, inter alia, appoint a defence counsel in sup-
porting the applicant; see the Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act, Sec-
tion 397.
109. An amendment of the Swedish Constitution requires two identical deci-
sions by the Swedish Parliament. Before the second decision, an election
needs to be arranged (Instrument of Government, Chapter 8 Sec-
tion 14). Note that the election held between the parliamentary deci-
sions need not to be a general election; an extraordinary election is suf-
ficient. The stipulated minimum time frame between the first and sec-
ond decisions is, nevertheless, nine months.
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the court system reviews itself. This will be discussed in
the following paragraphs.
One of the core questions when introducing a review
committee in any jurisdiction is to determine its level of
independence.110 Norway, for example, has established a
fully independent review committee in the sense that
the Norwegian Criminal Cases Review Commission has
the mandate to deem the application admissible, to
examine the case, to order the police and the prosecutor
to undertake investigative measures and – more impor-
tantly – to decide whether the case should be reop-
ened.111 If the Norwegian Commission decides to
reopen a case, a new trial should be held in a court.
Other countries, for example Belgium, have established
a review committee that could be categorised as semi-
independent. The Belgian Commission de revision en
matière pénale can review a case only if the Court of
Cassation has determined, inter alia, the admissibility of
the case. If deemed admissible, the case is forwarded to
the Belgian Commission, which gives an advisory opin-
ion on whether the Court of Cassation should approve
the application for exoneration. The final decision is
made by the Court.112
The examples of the Norwegian and the Belgian Com-
missions might be used as illustrations to further discuss
that the level of independence is associated with some
concerns. In the Swedish context, one of the problems
with a fully independent review committee would be
that its establishment could be perceived as introducing
a higher instance than the Supreme Court.113 Evidently,
this raises constitutional questions in regard to the divi-
sion of power, since in Sweden a review committee
would be considered an administrative authority, not a
court. Although Sweden does not have the same tradi-
tion as, e.g., some European jurisdictions concerning a
strong division of power, it might seem problematic for
an administrative authority to review a court of law.
However, since the Swedish Constitution is built on the
principle of ‘people sovereignty’,114 the constitutional
concerns might not necessarily be problematic. On the
contrary, the principle of ‘people sovereignty’ might
even help the case for establishing a review committee.
Furthermore, the establishment of the Norwegian Com-
110. For an overview of review committees in various jurisdictions, see, e.g.,
C. Hoyle and M. Sato, Reasons to Doubt. Wrongful Convictions and
the Criminal Cases Review Commission (2019), at 6-11.
111. For example, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, the Crim-
inal Cases Review Commission for England, Wales and Northern Ireland
and the New Zealand Criminal Cases Review Commission could be con-
sidered independent in a similar way as the Norwegian Commission,
since they can refer a granted application to the court. To the best of
the present author’s knowledge, the review committees in these juris-
dictions decide whether to grant an application, and a successful appli-
cation will result in a new hearing in a court.
112. See K. Verhesschen and C. Fijnaut, ‘Chosen Blindness or a Revelation of
the Truth? A New Procedure for Revision in Belgium’, Erasmus Law
Review, 4 (incomplete), (2020).
113. Cf. e.g. the travaux préparatoires: prop. 1939:307, at 26.
114. In Swedish: folksuveränitet, which is expressed in the Instrument of
Government, Chapter 1 Section 1 para. 1, stipulating that “All public
power in Sweden proceeds from the people.”
mission has not raised any major concerns in this
regard.115
Yet a semi-independent review committee also has its
disadvantages. Since a court decides whether an applica-
tion is admissible and makes the final decision on
whether to grant an application for exoneration, thereby
maintaining control over the question of which cases
should be reopened, one might question why it is neces-
sary to establish an organ by the side, and a semi-inde-
pendent review committee could therefore be perceived
as pro forma. The counterargument would be that even
though a system with a semi-independent review com-
mittee means that a court decides whether to grant the
application, a semi-independent review committee
would still improve the transparency of the review pro-
cess. This is perhaps the strongest argument for a semi-
independent review committee.
Another pertinent issue in this context is to design the
system such that an adequate balance is struck between
the principle of firmness and that of truth.116 This
aspect is particularly interesting since one might assume
that the establishment of a review committee would
increase the number of applications for exoneration.117
First, the existence of a review committee would not
necessarily affect the balance between these principles.
As long as new legal grounds for exoneration are not
adopted, the review committee would apply the existing
legal grounds, meaning, inter alia, that prior precedents
from the Supreme Court would remain an important
legal basis for deciding whether to grant an application
for exoneration. Second, even if a review committee
were introduced, the principle of firmness would still be
predominant. The reason would be mainly systematic:
in order for the legal system to be reliable, the outset
must be that a legally binding judgment should not be
reconsidered (unless the requirements are met for, inter
alia, exoneration). However, an independent organ
might find the requirements for exoneration to be met
in a larger number of applications than previously. That
does not mean that the principle of truth has trumped
the principle of firmness. Instead, a moderate assump-
tion would be that since the applications would be
examined more thoroughly than in the current Swedish
model, a slight increase in the number of approved cases
could be expected. Ideally, those cases would also have
been approved within the current model, but they might
not today be given the further examination needed in
order to ascertain that they actually meet the criteria for
exoneration.
Regardless of the level of independence, the importance
of establishing a review committee lies in its mandate to
scrutinise cases and applications, particularly in its pow-
115. See, e.g., the Norwegian travaux préparatoires: Ot. prp. nr 70
(2000-2001), at 30, where it was concluded that the establishment of
the Norwegian review committee, which is an administrative authority,
was not infringing the Norwegian Constitution.
116. See Section 2.1.1.
117. The experience from Norway seems to indicate that the number of
applications has been manageable since the Norwegian Commission
was established.
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er to mandate the police and the prosecutor to take
investigative measures. The prime role and function of a
review committee – whether independent or semi-inde-
pendent – is to ensure that the case is thoroughly
examined so that the later decision on whether to grant
the application (regardless of the outcome) is based on
adequately prepared documentation. Relating to the
Swedish context, the main argument for introducing a
review committee here is that it would improve the
degree of scrutiny and transparency. This is particularly
true for applicants who lack the resources that today
seem to be necessary in order to adhere to the language
of the court. It would also, as in Norway, presumably
increase the trust in the Swedish post-conviction review
process.
Hence, for the preceding reasons, there is a need to
introduce a review committee into Swedish law. How-
ever, issues concerning how a review committee in the
Swedish context should be designed and the details of
its procedure and its level of independence are perhaps
beyond the scope of this article. A reform of this kind
requires, as always in the Swedish lawmaking process,
that the government appoint a committee of inquiry to
examine these matters and present a detailed proposal in
regard to how the review committee could be modelled.
5 Conclusions
Sweden pays great respect to the rule of law and has put
several legal safeguards in place, guaranteeing a high
level of legal certainty and minimising the risk of
wrongful convictions. Generally, the Swedish criminal
justice system is robust and reliable. Swedish law fur-
ther allows for a post-conviction revision in criminal law
cases by, inter alia, regulating the possibility to apply for
exoneration. Since Swedish law emphasises the impor-
tance of the binding effect of a judgment, applications
for exoneration are granted only in extremely rare cases.
It makes sense that applications are generally dismissed;
otherwise, there would be a risk of undermining the
reliability of pronounced judgments in criminal law
cases. Thus, the present review shows no support for a
need to, for example, extend the current legal grounds
for invoking an application for exoneration.118
However, there are some factors that clearly limit the
understanding of how the Swedish justice system
actually works when administering applications for
118. Another matter is that the courts interpret an application for exonera-
tion according to the legal standards set out in the written law, while
many applicants lack both legal education and legal assistance. Thus, it
is assumed that many (almost all) convicted persons write their applica-
tions themselves. It is not unusual for an application to consist of hand-
written notes, almost impossible to interpret. The lack of legal assistance
clearly limits the actual use of the possibility to apply for exoneration.
Without legal assistance, it is, of course, difficult to submit an applica-
tion that the courts will even consider granting; see, further, Hellqvist,
above n. 9, at 151; Lidén et al., above n. 11, at 352-3. This question
falls without the scope of the present review but merits more scholarly
attention.
exoneration. Therefore, the review suggests that two
improvements are needed, concerning mainly the appli-
cation procedure. First, Sweden should introduce a
system that provides for official statistics on this matter.
This would enable researchers to analyse the statistics
of, for example, granted applications and their charac-
teristics. It would also improve the transparency of the
country’s criminal justice system. Secondly, the provi-
sions regulating the procedure for exoneration should be
reformed, having remained unchanged for almost eighty
years. According to the current Swedish model, applica-
tions for exoneration are administered within the court
system. The time has come to introduce into Swedish
law a model where applications for exoneration are
administered by a review committee. Although this rais-
es some constitutional concerns relating to, inter alia,
the division of power and the committee’s level of inde-
pendence, Sweden has nothing to lose by introducing a
model that would further enhance the legal certainty in
– and the transparency of – its criminal justice system.
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